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DESIGN THE SUPPORT
rather than
SUPPORT THE DESIGN

Arthur L. Scholz
Boeing Aerospace Operations
Cocoa Beach Fl.

William J. Dickinson
NASA
Kennedy Space Center, Fl

ABSTRACT

A major portion (73%) of the life cycle
cost of the Space Shuttle is related to
operations; this paper presents
recommendations for reducing that cost.
Operational cost drivers at the launch
site are identified, based on an
examination of Shuttle operational data
collected over the past two and one
half years.
For decades, the launch vehicles of the
Free World have been designed for
performance, with very little attention
given to consideration for support
and/or maintainability. Examples are:
multiple commodities; toxic materials;
complexity; ordnance;
inaccessibility; unique systems or
components (lack of commonality and
multiple function); Flight hardware
designs drive Launch Site resources
for: test operations to demonstrate
hardware/software conformance to design
parameters; test personnel—numbers
and skill mix; ground support
equipment; facilities; assembly; and
maintenance. A case is made for
incorporating support and
maintainability criteria in the design
process.

operability analyses outside the design
process, and usually "after the fact",
with little or no input to major design
decisions. As a result, after the
hardware is shipped to the launch site,
the onus is on the personnel there to
"make it work". Fortunately, launch
site personnel have been very successful
in "making it work", but the recurring
cost of operations has been excessive.

Boeing Aerospace Operations has
conducted a two-and-one-half year study
known as "Shuttle Ground Operations
Efficiencies/Technologies Study" for the
Kennedy Space Center, using the Space
Shuttle Program as a source of data.
(Final report of the entire study is
available from the authors, as well as
the library of each of the NASA
centers.) Operational cost drivers were
identified and recommendations were made
to eliminate or reduce those items. The
results of the study indicated that
although it may be too late to
"significantly" change the Shuttle
system per se, development of launch
site criteria for use by the various
design agencies would be beneficial for
future programs. The study began with
an exhaustive examination of the
prelaunch and postlanding process and
provides, for the first time, a
INTRODUCTION
published set of launch site data
Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of space
vehicle systems have been significantly prepared to a level of detail
sufficiently rigorous and credible for
influenced by inordinately excessive
acceptance and use by design
operations costs, due to the fact that
for decades, vehicles have been designed organizations. Although it was a
primarily (if not exclusively) for
generally accepted premise that the
performance, with practically no
Shuttle system is not as efficient as
attention given to operability. The
predicted, the actual figures are quite
current practice is to perform
startling. The system costs more than
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promised, it is not as productive, and
it costs more to fly (e.g. cost per
pound of payload in orbit is ten times
the projected cost) (see figure !.)• A
significant contributor to the
greater-than-projected cost is the fact
that the launch processing time is more
than ten times the original design goal
of 160 hours (see figure 2.).
Furthermore, due to safety requirements
imposed as a result of the Challenger
accident, the processing time is
becoming longer, rather than shorter.

activities at the launch site, as veil
as a new philosophy in the management of
the Program.

The next major space vehicle on the
horizon is- the Advanced Launch System
(ALS). The ALS Program has a stated
goal of reducing the cost of launching
payloads by an order of magnitude. It
is a formidable goal, and will require a
new way of doing business—starting with
the preparation of the requirements (as
defined in the Request for Proposals) to
the design of the vehicle, to
manufacture of the hardware, to the
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The design of flight hardware
drives launch site resources
(facilities, consumables, and personnel)
for: test operations to demonstrate
hardware/software conformance to design
parameters; test sequences and
schedules; hardware configuration
control practices; test personnel numbers and skill mix; GSE (Ground
Support Equipment); and facilities.
The first action that must be taken to
assure the incorporation of launch
operation criteria in the design process
is a change in mind-set: designers of
future vehicles, beginning with the
design concept phase, must put life
cycle costs ahead of performance. We
are hauling cargo via a freighter—not
participating in a yacht race for the
America's Cup! The place to start is in
the preparation of the RFP (Request For
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Proposals), where presently, there are
two prevalent practices that contribute
to excessive cost (see Figure 3). One
is the tendency to prescribe hov the job
is to be done» rather than describe the
required performance of the requested
product! and the other is to impose

specifications that are aore stringent
than required. A prospective supplier'i
innovative approach is frequently
stifled by constraints on size, weight,
performance (e.g. specific impulse),
test requirements, etc.
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Government procurement must utilize
a contracting mode that establishes
prime contractors with sufficient
authority for system integration to
define not only the operational
requirements for the system, but the
detailed, specific configuration
requirements as well, including hardware
and software. This will enable
cost-effective management for the total
system architecture, including hardware
acceptance and sub-contractor control.
Contracts that specify GFE (Government
Furnished Equipment), such as engines,
and dictate detailed specifications
rather than the performance of the
product severely limit a prime
contractor's ability to achieve the
optimum design, or manage the job in a
cost effective manner. Most detail
hardware specifications limit the
contractor's capability to be innovative
and cost effective. The list of
applicable specifications in an RFP is
usually based on "What did we do last
time?". Many requirements are
substantially arbitrary, and
conservative requirements never get
reevaluated and go away.
Major recurring operational cost
drivers are instigated by decisions made
in the design process. There often are
design Solutions that will substantially
reduce those operational costs and thus
reduce life cycle cost. They can be
found in all elements of the vehicle:
avionics and software, power, structures
and materials, propulsion, as well as
facilities and support equipment. A
simple, robust propulsion system, for
instance, is a prime candidate. Some
suggested solutions are:
1) An integrated system, that within
itself, provides the essential
elements of main propulsion, orbit
insertion, and attitude control.
Such an integration would radically
reduce the supporting operations and
maintenance.
2) Provide Thrust Vector Control or a
form of vehicle attitude control by a
means other than gimballed engines.
The vehicle and ground operations
will be simplified by the deletion of
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gimballed engines and the associated
systems. Most gimbal actuators are
driven by hydraulic systems, which
are inherently complex and plagued
with Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
and GSE activities. They require
extensive check-out, are subject to
leakage, and require a "standing
army" of engineers and technical
specialists. If gimballing cannot be
eliminated, use an alternate
actuation system such as
electro-mechanical devices.
3) A vehicle design that uses only
one set of commodities (oxidizer and
fuel), will simplify propellant
procurement, transport, storage,
pumping, safety equipment, etc. The
Shuttle has five propellant
components. Each of the associated
ground systems requires its own
operational procedures; its little
army of engineers, technicians,
safety personnel, expensive,
hazardous facilities, and specialized
GSE.
4) Avoid the use of hypergols for
propulsion or APU (Auxiliary Power
Unit) systems. A very significant
quantity of non-productive manhours
is consumed during each Shuttle
launch processing flow for "area
clear" during hazardous "opening",
entry, or operation of these systems.
There is also a snowball effect on
facilities and O&M requirements for
special ventilation, scrubbers and <
multitude of safety equipment,
including a small army specially
trained to do its job in SCAPE
(Self-Contained Atmospheric
Protective Ensemble) suits.
Another significant conclusion in
the study was that the increased
application of automation to evaluate
systems and conduct operations will
provide several means for reducing
launch operations costs and will provide
benefits such as:
(1) Increase the speed of the total
checkout (reduce time -in-flow
requirements).
(2) Reduce manpower requirements

(3) Reduce the possibility of human
error.
(4) Minimize documentation changes
(test-to-test consistency) and
increase the potential for reducing
the time required for manual tasks as
a result of the "learning curve"
process

after maintenance and retest is
accomplished, all associated test
requirements would be automatically
verified.

(4) Multiflow Redundant Avionics
Suite (MFRAS)7To support mandated
system availability, avionics systems
must provide for higher reliability
The area that will benefit most
by providing several levels of fault
from the incorporation of additional
tolerance through redundancy. Future
automation techniques is "Test and
systems could be designed such that
Checkout". Improvements that should be
they can be dynamically configured to
provided in that area include:
provide for more than one function.
(1) 100% Computer Connectivity. All
Should an allocated processor or
computers associated in any manner
subsystem fail, another processor
with operations, flight or ground,
with a lesser priority function would
must maintain complete connectivity
be assigned to reconfigure and
(bridging). The large amount of data perform the function of the failed
required to support and maintain an
processor.
operational system requires
efficiency in its acquisition,
(5) Returned Vehicle Self-test for
processing, and use. Paperwork,
Reflight. After flight, the returned
including its development,
vehicle should have sufficient
maintenance, use, and control,
self-test capability to verify its
currently consumes a large portion of readiness for the next flight or
the operations budget. A significant provide problem isolation down to the
reduction in Life Cycle Cost can be
LRU (Line Replaceable Unit) level.
achieved by intensive application and During flight, BIT identifies and
use of automation to reduce the
records anomalies. After landing,
amount of paperwork required to
BIT/BITE isolates the problem to the
process the vehicle.
LRU level. After replacement of the
faulty component(s), BIT retests the
(2) Automated Electronics.
system and verifies flight readiness.
Operational and support procedures
should be based and maintained on
(6) Autonomous Guidance Navigation
computers. Automation of the OMI
and Control (GN&C). Onboard BIT/BITE
(Operations and Maintenance
of GN&C can eliminate, simplify or
Instructions) process, including
reduce the requirements for ground
development, maintenance, and use of support operations. The use of
OMIs, provides improvements in costs, computerized electronics similar to
discipline of usage, verification of that in the Boeing 757/767 or
performance data, and compliance with advanced military aircraft would
configuration changes.
provide self-test and fault isolation
to the LRU level of system elements.
(3) Automatic Verification of Test
The design should include the concern
Requirements. An automated testing
for easy accessibility of components
system would verify and document the and should provide the capability to
satisfaction of approved test
replace circuit boards without system
requirements and would automatically shutdown.
correlate the verification with the
completion of the associated
(7) Software Commonality. The
procedures. & truly paperless,
vehicle should utilize the same set
automated OMI would control the
of software for ground operation
sequence execution and scheduling
test, integration, and flight
systems 'that track the completion of operations. Current Shuttle ground
each procedure and task. As each
operations are accomplished with
task is completed without error, or
several different programs, depending
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on the stage of testing.
Consequently, manhours are consumed
reloading the main computer memory.
For example; it requires 14 hours to
accomplish the final prelaunch load.
The avionics should be designed as a
distributed system with one or more
high speed buses providing
communication between subsystems as
required. Each subsystem should be
capable of autonomous ground
operations by commanding the system
to a stand-alone mode. In this mode
all required external stimuli would
be sufficiently simulated by the
subsystem to verify its proper
operation. This would enable each
subsystem to be tested independently
of the operational state of the other
systems. When all ground testing and
vehicle integration is complete, each
subsystem would be commanded to the
flight mode without additional
reloading of the flight computers.
The achievement of the stated goal
of reducing the cost of payload to orbit
by an order of magnitude will require a
change in "mind-set" on the part of each
person on the Project Team. It must
start at the top with a leader with the
imagination and fortitude to "buck the
tide". Albert Enstein wrote:
"Imagination is more important than
knowledge, it is a preview of coming
attractions." James Vebb, the first
Administrator of NASA was such a leader.
In the October, 1988 issue of Government
Executive, Elmer Staats wrote that when
Vebb was first approached by Vice
President Johnson and President Kennedy
about accepting the position of NASA
Administrator, he demurred on the
grounds that he was not a scientist or
engineer. However, after receiving an
expression of confidence from President
Kennedy, he accepted. Later he (Vebb)
wrote: "The key executive must be able
and willing to adjust his own work and
the work of those associated with him to
the needs of the totality. He must be
able and willing to forego use of his
position for 'hobby shopping' in accord
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with his own interests and his own
individual judgments about what is most
important. He must be willing, when
necessary, to take actions calculated to
get the total job done and to assume
responsibility for decisions and
judgments of others, even when he would
himself have it otherwise."
Fortunately, opportunity exists
today to significantly improve the
process of considering system
supportability requirements while
designing a system that meets
performance criteria. To make the most
of these opportunities requires two
major changes in our way of doing
business:
(1) Change the "mind set" of all of
us in the space program to make (or
accept) compromises in performance if
they contribute to a reduction in
LCC.
(2) Provide more effort (dollars) up
front in the early design phase to
provide for operationally efficient,
supportable and maintainable, robust
systems.
The objective should be Design the
Support along with the rest of the
sys t em. Eliminate the need to Support
the Design with large groups of people
during the recurring prelaunch
processing, launch operations, vehicle
recovery, and refurbishment activities.
Sufficient data are available from
previous programs to help the designers
solve many of the operational problems.
Use of that data to effectively reduce
recurring Operational Costs would
require that all levels of Program
management (Government and Industry) put
in place the organizational mechanisms
to place Operational Requirements on an
equal or higher level than Performance
Requrements in the interest of reducing
those costs.
THIS IS A CHALLENGE FOR THE ENTIRE
INDUSTRY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION(S) OF
SPACE SYSTEMS -- BOOSTERS, UPPER STAGES,
AND PAYLOADS.

